Albania’s constitutional regime of parliamentary and ministerial immunity, anchored in Article 73 and reshaped by the 2012–2016 reforms, reflects a deliberate effort to narrow privilege without weakening institutional independence. Immunity today is functional and procedural, designed to protect parliamentary activity from coercive interference rather than to shield misconduct or corruption. This paper examines the structure and purpose of Albania’s immunity framework, with particular attention to the Constitutional Court’s 2024 Berisha ruling, which clarified the distinction between deprivations of personal liberty and lesser procedural restrictions subject to ordinary proportionality review. Against this doctrinal background, the paper analyzes the ongoing standoff between SPAK and Parliament concerning the immunity of Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku, without prejudging criminal liability. It argues that the constitutional tension lies not in whether immunity applies to corruption—it does not—but in how Parliament exercises its procedural discretion. Finally, the paper outlines the legitimate constitutional avenues available to the opposition before the Constitutional Court to seek clarification and preserve the separation of powers within Albania’s post-reform constitutional order.
by Professor Kadri Kryeziu | 8 January 2026
Introduction: Why Immunity Is No Longer a Technical Question
In Albania today, immunity is no longer a marginal constitutional issue. It sits at the intersection of criminal accountability, parliamentary autonomy, and the credibility of the post-2016 justice reform. The current standoff between SPAK and Parliament over the immunity of Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku has exposed this tension in its most concrete form.
At stake is not simply whether a particular official may be arrested or detained. What is at stake is whether immunity functions as the Constitution intended it to function: as a temporary procedural safeguard, or whether it risks mutating back into a substantive shield against criminal justice. The answer lies not in political rhetoric but in constitutional structure, jurisprudence, and institutional behavior.
This paper revisits Albania’s immunity framework after the 2012–2016 reforms, analyzes the Constitutional Court’s Berisha jurisprudence, applies that doctrine to the Balluku proceedings, and—critically—examines what constitutional tools the opposition legitimately possesses to challenge a parliamentary-prosecutorial deadlock before the Constitutional Court.
1. What Immunity Is—and Is Not—Under the Albanian Constitution
Article 73 of the Albanian Constitution establishes parliamentary immunity in three tightly connected parts. The first protects deputies from legal responsibility for opinions expressed and votes cast in Parliament, subject to an explicit exception for defamation. This is functional immunity in its classic sense: it protects deliberation, not behavior.
The second paragraph introduces procedural inviolability. Deputies may not be arrested, deprived of liberty, or subjected to personal or home searches without the prior authorization of the Assembly. Crucially, this provision does not block investigations, indictments, or judicial proceedings. It is concerned only with the most intrusive coercive measures—those that physically constrain the individual and risk disrupting the parliamentary function.
The third paragraph narrows the protection further. In cases of flagrante delicto involving serious crimes, arrest or detention may occur without parliamentary authorization, provided Parliament is immediately notified and retains the power to review the measure.
This architecture makes one thing clear: immunity in Albania is conditional, limited, and functional. It does not protect corruption. It does not protect misconduct. It protects the institutional integrity of Parliament against premature or politically motivated coercion.
When ministers are also deputies, Article 103 extends the same regime to them. Immunity follows the parliamentary mandate, not executive power.
2. Why the 2012–2016 Reforms Matter More Than Ever
Before 2012, immunity in Albania operated as a blunt instrument. Parliamentary authorization was routinely treated as a political veto rather than a constitutional safeguard. Investigations stalled. Accountability eroded. Public trust collapsed.
The 2012 constitutional amendments were designed to dismantle that logic without destroying parliamentary protection altogether. Immunity was narrowed to specific coercive measures. Investigations and prosecutions were liberated from constitutional paralysis. Parliament’s role was reduced to a procedural checkpoint, not a gatekeeper of justice.
The 2016 justice reform completed this transformation institutionally. By strengthening prosecutorial independence, creating SPAK, and empowering constitutional review, it ensured that immunity would no longer function in isolation but within a system of checks.
These reforms matter because they define the interpretive environment in which Article 73 must now be read. Any attempt to revive a broad, obstructionist understanding of immunity is not merely politically questionable—it is constitutionally anachronistic.
3. The Berisha Ruling: Immunity Clarified, Not Expanded
The Constitutional Court’s decision in Vendim nr. 81/2024—the Berisha case—was the first serious stress test of Article 73 in the post-reform era.
The Court was asked to decide whether security measures imposed on an MP—specifically compulsory appearance and a travel ban—constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty requiring parliamentary authorization.
The Court’s answer was precise and structurally important. It drew a clear constitutional distinction between personal liberty and freedom of movement. Deprivation of liberty, the Court held, refers to classic custodial measures: arrest, detention, and comparable forms of confinement such as house arrest. It does not automatically include every restriction imposed in a criminal proceeding.
On this basis, the Court upheld the compulsory appearance obligation. It found that such a measure neither deprived the MP of personal liberty nor materially interfered with parliamentary duties. Immunity was not engaged.
At the same time, the Court revoked the travel ban and ordered the return of the passport. This was not because a travel ban inherently requires parliamentary authorization. It was because, in that specific case, the measure failed proportionality and necessity standards under ordinary constitutional review.
The lesson of Berisha is decisive: immunity analysis and proportionality analysis are distinct. A measure may pass the immunity threshold and still fail constitutional scrutiny. Conversely, immunity does not operate as a veto against criminal process.
4. The Balluku Proceedings: Facts That Frame the Law
Publicly available reporting indicates that SPAK initiated criminal proceedings in late 2025 concerning alleged procurement irregularities involving major infrastructure projects, including the Llogara Tunnel and Tirana’s Outer Ring Road. Belinda Balluku, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, was registered as a person under investigation.
Reported measures include searches connected to associates and institutional contexts, a ban on leaving the country, and a temporary suspension from ministerial duties. SPAK subsequently requested parliamentary authorization to lift immunity in order to pursue custodial measures, citing risks of flight and interference with evidence.
No claim of flagrante delicto has been publicly advanced.
On 12 December 2025, the Constitutional Court ordered Balluku’s reinstatement to public office pending further proceedings. The Court did not rule on guilt or innocence. Its intervention was procedural and constitutional in nature.
These facts matter because they activate different constitutional layers—and because they reveal where the current standoff truly lies.
5. Applying the Doctrine: What Immunity Covers in the Balluku Case
Under the Berisha framework, several conclusions follow with relative clarity.
First, travel restrictions fall within the domain of freedom of movement, not personal liberty. They do not automatically trigger Article 73’s immunity protection and may be imposed without parliamentary authorization, subject to proportionality review.
Second, suspension from ministerial duties is not an immunity issue at all. Immunity governs coercive measures affecting liberty and protected searches. Suspension engages due process and proportionality, not Article 73. The Constitutional Court’s reinstatement decision confirms that such measures remain constitutionally reviewable even when immunity is not implicated.
Third, custodial measures—arrest, detention, or house arrest—sit at the core of Article 73. Absent flagrante delicto, these measures require prior parliamentary authorization. This is the constitutional hard stop.
Fourth, personal and home searches directed at the deputy herself fall within the same protected zone. Searches of third parties or institutional premises do not automatically engage immunity.
Up to this point, the constitutional framework is coherent. The crisis begins not with doctrine, but with institutional behavior.
6. The Standoff: When Immunity Becomes an Institutional Conflict
The current standoff between SPAK and Parliament is not fundamentally about whether immunity applies to corruption. That question, constitutionally speaking, is already settled: it does not.
The real conflict is about how Parliament exercises its procedural discretion. When Parliament refuses or indefinitely delays a decision on immunity, or justifies refusal on grounds unrelated to custodial proportionality, it risks transforming a procedural safeguard into a substantive obstruction.
This is where the opposition enters the constitutional picture.
7. What the Opposition Can Ask the Constitutional Court
The opposition cannot ask the Constitutional Court to lift Balluku’s immunity. It cannot ask the Court to authorize arrest. It cannot ask the Court to rule on guilt or innocence. Those are political fantasies, not constitutional remedies.
But the opposition can ask something far more powerful.
a) Abstract Interpretation of Article 73
Under Article 113 of the Constitution, a group of at least one-fifth of deputies may request an abstract interpretation of constitutional provisions. This allows the Court to clarify meaning, scope, and limits—without intervening in a specific criminal case.
The opposition may legitimately ask the Court to interpret whether Article 73 extends immunity to criminal proceedings involving corruption and misconduct committed outside parliamentary functions.
The likely answer—grounded in reform history and Berisha—would be unequivocal: immunity does not apply to criminal proceedings as such. It applies only to specific custodial measures, and only as a temporary procedural filter.
Such a ruling would not force Parliament’s hand, but it would strip Parliament of any constitutional narrative that immunity shields corruption cases.
b) Constitutional Conflict of Competences
The opposition may also file a case alleging a conflict of competences between Parliament and the prosecutorial authorities.
The argument would not be that Parliament must lift immunity, but that Parliament, by refusing or delaying action without constitutionally relevant reasoning, is distorting Article 73 and undermining the separation of powers.
In such cases, the Court does not replace Parliament’s decision. It reviews whether Parliament has exercised its role within constitutional bounds. It may require Parliament to re-decide, to reason properly, or to respect proportionality standards.
This is the Court’s preferred intervention model: correcting process, not outcomes.
8. What the Court Is Likely to Say—and What It Will Not Say
The Court will not declare Parliament unconstitutional simply for refusing to lift immunity. It will not authorize arrest. It will not name Balluku.
But it is highly likely to reaffirm four principles:
First, immunity does not protect corruption or misconduct.
Second, Parliament’s discretion is procedural, not absolute.
Third, refusal to lift immunity must be justified in terms of custodial proportionality, not political loyalty or institutional solidarity.
Fourth, indefinite obstruction risks constitutional violation.
Such a ruling would recalibrate the standoff without collapsing institutional boundaries.
Conclusion: Immunity as a Test of Constitutional Maturity
Albania’s immunity regime is no longer a relic of political privilege. It is a narrow, functional instrument designed to protect parliamentary integrity without undermining criminal accountability.
The Balluku standoff is therefore not a failure of constitutional design. It is a test of constitutional maturity. The question is not whether immunity applies to corruption—it does not. The question is whether institutions are willing to act within the limits the Constitution has already set.
The opposition has constitutional tools to force clarification without politicization. The Court has jurisprudence to intervene without overreach. Whether the system holds will determine not just the outcome of one case, but the credibility of Albania’s post-reform constitutional order.
